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Abstract. Recent high-profile targeted attacks showed that even the
most secure and secluded networks can be compromised by motivated
and resourceful attackers, and that such a system compromise may not
be immediately detected by the system owner. Researchers at RSA pro-
posed the FlipIt game to study the impact of such stealthy takeovers.
In the basic FlipIt game, an attacker and a defender fight over a sin-
gle resource; in practice, however, systems typically consist of multiple
resources that can be targeted. In this paper, we present FlipThem, a
generalization of FlipIt to multiple resources. To formulate the players’
goals and study their best strategies, we introduce two control models:
in the AND model, the attacker has to compromise all resources in order
to take over the entire system, while in the OR model, she has to com-
promise only one. Our analytical and numerical results provide practical
recommendations for defenders.
Keywords: FlipIt, game theory, advanced persistent threats, targeted
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the world witnessed a series of high-profile targeted attacks
against various targets [4,19,7,8,2,5,14,13]. These attacks showed that even the
most secure and secluded networks can be compromised, and they induced an
interesting discussion in the security industry and in the research community
alike. An important lesson that the security community can learn from these in-
cidents is that we must revisit some of the most fundamental assumptions which
our systems rely on for security. In particular, one must make the assumption
that motivated and resourceful attackers can fully compromise a system and gain
access to its resources, and this may not be immediately detected by the system
owner. The new challenge is to design security mechanisms that minimize the
damage that such determined attackers can cause.
In order to help to address this challenge, researchers at RSA – which it-
self was a victim of a successful targeted attack in 2011 [18] – developed a
game-theoretic modeling framework, called FlipIt [3,1]. FlipIt is an attacker-
defender game designed to study the problem of stealthy takeover of control over
a critical resource. In FlipIt, control over the critical resource is obtained by
“flipping” it for a certain cost, and the players receive benefits proportional to
the total time that they control the resource. The payoff of each player is, there-
fore, determined by the difference between the benefit of controlling the resource
and the cost of flipping it. Naturally, the goal of the players is to maximize their
payoffs.
This is a simple, yet powerful model to study the strategic interaction of
attackers and designers of security policies and mechanisms. Moreover, the basic
model can be extended in different directions. For instance, in the basic FlipIt
game, the players flip the resource without being able to observe who was in
control before the flip. This model is ideal to study the security of a resource
with off-line properties, such as passwords or cryptographic keys. In [16], Pham
and Cid extend the basic model by giving the players the option to test if they
control the resource before making a move, and use this extended model to study
periodic security assessments and their positive effects. In [12,11], Laszka et al.
propose and study another variation of the model, in which the defender’s moves
are non-stealthy, while the attacker’s moves are non-instantaneous. Finally, re-
searchers have also studied the FlipIt game in behavioral experiments, where
human participants played against computerized opponents [15,17,6], which com-
plement the theoretical work by showing the difficulty of finding optimal choices
in games of timing.
In this paper, we propose a new generalization of the FlipIt game, which,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered yet in the academic liter-
ature. Namely, we extend the basic FlipIt model, where the attacker and the
defender fight over a single resource, to multiple resources. Accordingly, we call
our generalized model the FlipThem game. In practice, compromising a system
often requires more than attacking just a single component of it. Typically, suc-
cessful takeovers consist of multiple steps, aiming at gradually escalating the
privileges obtained by the attacker until he obtains full administrative access to
the system. During this process, the attacker must gain control over a subset of
available resources (e.g., he may be required to break a password and exploit a
software vulnerability in an application). Hence, our model is closer to reality
than the original FlipIt game, and, as we show in this paper, it is still amenable
to mathematical analysis.
More specifically, we make the following contributions in this paper:
– We extend the FlipIt game to multiple resources. To formulate the players’
goals, we introduce two control models: the AND and the OR control model.
In the AND control model, the attacker needs to compromise all resources
in order to take over the entire system, whereas in the OR control model,
the attacker needs to control at least one resource (out of many available) to
take over the entire system. More complex requirements on combinations of
resources to be compromised for a successful take-over can be constructed
by appropriate combination of these basic control models.
– As a first step to derive good multi-resource FlipThem strategies, we in-
troduce two combinations of single-resource FlipIt strategies, namely the
independent and the synchronized combinations. In the independent case,
the player flips each resource independently of the other resources, whereas
in the synchronized case, the player always flips all resources together. We
study and compare these two combinations, and derive analytical results for
the players’ gains.
– As a next step, to represent more complex multi-resource strategies, we in-
troduce the Markov strategy class, where the decision to flip a resource (or
set of resources) at a given time depends only on the times elapsed since
the previous flips of the resources. We show how the best-response Markov
strategy can be computed using a linear program. Using this linear program,
we compare various defender strategies based on the resulting benefit for the
defender.
– Finally, based on our analytical and numerical results, we provide practical
recommendations for defenders. These recommendations can readily be used
in practice where the assumptions of the FlipThem game apply.
It is important to note that, while the idea of generalizing FlipIt to multiple
resources may seem straightforward, the exact mathematical treatment of Flip-
Them is not trivial at all. The reason for this is that FlipThem is more than
just the collection of independent FlipIt instances. In general, the attacker
and/or defender strategies in FlipThem do not handle the different resources
independently from each other, and this dependence among the resources results
in complex optimization problems when solving the game.
The organization of this paper is the following. In Section 2, we summarize
the FlipIt game and the most important conclusions drawn in related work.
In Section 3, we introduce FlipThem, the generalization of FlipIt for multiple
resources. In Section 4, we show how single-resource FlipIt strategies can be
combined into multi-resource strategies and compute the players’ benefits for
various combinations. In Section 5, we introduce the Markov strategy class and
show how a best-response Markov strategy can be computed using a linear pro-
gram. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the implications of our results and provide
practical recommendations for defenders.
2 The FlipIt Game
In this section, we summarize the FlipIt game and the most important con-
clusions drawn in related work. It is important to get familiar with the key
concepts and notation of the original FlipIt game to understand our results for
the multiple resources case. Table 1 contains the most important differences in
notation between the original FlipIt game and our FlipThem game. Note that
the assumptions of the FlipIt game are very different from those of the previous
work in the field of game theory for security. For a detailed comparison between
FlipIt and previous work, we refer the reader to [3].
FlipIt [3,1] is a two-player, non-zero-sum game modeling stealthy takeovers,
in which both players are trying take control of a single resource. One of the
players is called the defender (denoted by D), while the other player is called the
Table 1. List of Symbols
Symbol Description
FlipIt
ci player i’s flipping cost
βi ” asymptotic benefit rate
γi ” ” gain rate
αi ” ” flip rate
Zi random variable representing the time since the last flip of player i
FlipThem
N number of resources
cir player i’s flipping cost for resource r
αir ” asymptotic flip rate for resource r
Zir rand. var. representing the time since the last flip of player i on resource r
attacker (denoted by A). The game starts at time t = 0 and continues indefinitely
(that is, t → ∞). In general, time can be both continuous and discrete, with
most results being applicable to both cases. At any time instance, player i may
choose to take control of the resource by “flipping” it, which costs her ci. Then,
the resource remains under the control of player i until the other player flips it.
Consequently, at any given time instance, the resource is controlled by either one
or the other player. The interesting aspect of the FlipIt game is that neither of
the players knows who is in control. As a result, the players occasionally make
unnecessary flips (i.e., flip the resource when it is already under their control)
since they have to execute their flips “blindly”. For an illustration of the game,
see Figure 1.
t
Fig. 1. An illustration of the FlipIt game with discrete flip timing. Blue and red
disks represent the defender’s and attacker’s flips. Takeovers, that is, flips changing the
player controlling the resource, are indicated by arrows. Blue and red shaded rectangles
represent control of the resource by the defender and the attacker, respectively.
The state of the resource is represented by the time-dependent variables CA
and CD: CA(t) = 1 when the attacker controls the resource, and 0 otherwise;
CD(t) is vice versa (i.e., CD(t) = 1− CA(t)). Since the players can (and, as we
will soon see, should) employ randomized strategies, both CD(t) and CA(t) are
random variables. The variables CD(t) and CA(t) can be also expressed using
the times elapsed since the last flips made by the players as
CD(t) = IZD(t)≤ZA(t) and C
A(t) = IZD(t)>ZA(t) , (1)
where Zi is the time elapsed since the last flip of player i and I is the indicator
function.
Player i’s asymptotic gain rate γi is defined as the average fraction of time
the resource is controlled by player i. Formally,
γi = lim inf
t→∞
∫ t
0
Ci(τ)dτ
t
. (2)
Note that player i’s asymptotic gain is equal to the probability that the resource
is controlled by player i at a random time instance. Formally,
γi = Pr
[
Ci = 1
]
. (3)
Player i’s asymptotic flip rate αi is defined as the average number of flips made
by player i in a unit of time. Formally,
αi = lim inf
t→∞
ni(t)
t
, (4)
where ni(t) denotes the number of flips made by player i up to time t. Finally,
player i’s game-theoretic utility, called player i’s asymptotic benefit βi, is defined
as the average fraction of time the resource is controlled by the player minus the
average cost of flips. Formally,
βi = γi − ciαi . (5)
Since takeovers are assumed to be stealthy in the FlipIt game, players do
not automatically know when the other player has last moved. However, when a
player makes a move (i.e., flips the resource), she might be able to receive some
feedback. For example, when an attacker compromises a system, she may learn
when the defender last updated the system (that could be attributed as a flip
action), and use this information to plan her next move. In [3], three models are
introduced for feedback received during the game:
– Non-adaptive (NA): The player does not receive any feedback when she
moves.
– Last move (LM): The player learns the exact time of the other player’s last
flip.
– Full history (FH): The player learns the complete history of flips made by
the other player.
Besides receiving feedback during the game, a player might also be able to
receive information before the game starts. For example, an attacker might learn
the defender’s flip strategy and exploit this knowledge. In [3], two models are
introduced for information received by a player before the game starts:
– Rate of Play (RP): The player knows the asymptotic flip rate α of the other
player.
– Knowledge of Strategy (KS): Besides the asymptotic flip rate, the player
knows additional information about the other player’s strategy. For exam-
ple, the player may know that the other player employs a renewal process
to generate her flip sequence, and may also know the probability density
function of the process. However, it is always assumed that the randomness
of the other player’s strategy remains secret; consequently, the player cannot
know which realization of the renewal process will be used.
In our analysis of defender’s strategies in Section 5, we assume a strong attacker
model meaning that the attacker always has the Knowledge of Strategy. We
assume that the attacker knows everything, except the randomness part of the
defender’s strategy. This complies with Kerckhoff’s principle on security without
obscurity.
2.1 Strategies
In this subsection, we summarize the most important strategies and the cor-
responding results from [3]. For a detailed analysis of these and some other
strategies, we refer the interested reader to [3].
In this paper, we focus on non-adaptive strategies, which do not require
feedback received by the player during the game. The rationale behind this is
that
– defenders rarely know the exact strategies of the attackers (or even the iden-
tities of the attackers) in practice; thus, they have to use strategies that do
not rely on feedback,
– defenders can choose randomized strategies that schedule their subsequent
flips such that even an FH attacker has no more advantage than random
guessing (see exponential strategy below), and
– in case of high-importance computer systems, attackers might have limited
feedback options if they want to operate stealthily.
A renewal strategy is a non-adaptive strategy in which the time intervals
between consecutive flips are generated by a renewal process. More formally, time
intervals between consecutive moves are independent and identically distributed
random variables, chosen according to a probability density function f . Renewal
strategies include (but are not limited to) periodic strategies and non-arithmetic
renewal strategies, which we discuss below.
A player can also choose to drop out of the game (i.e., never flip the resource),
which is a rational decision if her expected benefit is less than zero for every
strategy choice available to her. This can happen when her opponent’s flipping
cost is much lower and her opponent can afford to flip the resource extremely
fast.
Periodic P: A strategy is periodic if the time intervals between consecutive
flips are constant, denoted by δ. It is assumed that a periodic strategy has a
random phase, that is, the time of the first flip is chosen uniformly at random
from [0, δ]. A periodic strategy with random phase is characterized by the fixed
time interval δ between consecutive flips. It is easy to see that the flip rate of
a periodic strategy is α = 1δ . The periodic strategy of rate α is denoted by Pα ,
and the class of all periodic strategies is denoted by P.
Periodic is probably the strategy most widely used in practice as most sys-
tems require passwords, cryptographic keys, etc. to be changed at regular inter-
vals, for example, every thirty days or every three months. In [3], it was shown
that the periodic strategy strongly dominates all other renewal strategies if the
other player uses a periodic or non-arithmetic renewal strategy. Thus, the peri-
odic strategy is a good choice for an attacker who plays against a non-adaptive
(NA) defender.
However, due to its completely deterministic nature3, the periodic strategy
is a very poor choice for defenders who face an attacker observing the last move
of the defender (LM attacker). An LM attacker can learn the exact time of the
defender’s next flip, and schedule her own flip to be immediately after that.
Consequently, if flipping costs are of the same order of magnitude, an attacker
can keep the resource permanently under her control (with negligible interrupts
from the defender). Therefore, a defender facing an LM attacker has two options:
if her flipping cost is much lower than that of the attacker, she can flip fast
enough to force the attacker to drop out; otherwise, she has to use a randomized
strategy, such as the following ones.
Non-arithmetic renewal R: A renewal process is called non-arithmetic if
there is no positive real number d > 0 such that interarrival times are all integer
multiples of d. The renewal strategy generated by the non-arithmetic renewal
process with probability density function f is denoted by Rf , and the class of
all non-arithmetic renewal strategies is denoted by R.
The class of non-arithmetic renewal strategies is very broad as there are
an infinite number of possible probability density functions, even for a given
flip rate. Of these probability density functions, the exponential is the most
important one in the FlipIt game.
Exponential E: An exponential (or Poisson) strategy is a non-arithmetic
renewal strategy generated by a Poisson process. Formally, the interarrival times
of the process follow an exponential distribution: f(τ) = λe−λτ , where λ is the
parameter characterizing the distribution. The flip rate of this strategy is simply
α = λ. The exponential strategy with rate λ is denoted by Eλ, and the class of
all exponential strategies is denoted by E .
The exponential strategy is of key importance, because the exponential dis-
tribution is the only memoryless continuous probability distribution. The mem-
oryless property means that the conditional probability that we have to wait
more than τ1 time before the next flip, given that the time elapsed since the last
flip is τ2, is independent of τ2. This implies that, if a defender uses an exponential
strategy, an LM (or even an FH) attacker cannot learn any information regard-
ing the time of the defender’s next flip. Consequently, the exponential strategy
is a good choice for a defender facing an LM attacker.
3 The random phase ensures that an NA opponent cannot determine the flip times of
the player; however, if the opponent learns the exact time of at least one flip made
by the player, she is able to determine the time of every flip.
3 The FlipThem Game: FlipIt on Multiple Resources
In this section, we generalize the FlipIt game for multiple resources as follows.
There are N resources, identified by integer numbers 1, . . . , N . Each resource
can be flipped individually and, as a result, becomes controlled by the flipping
player. The cost of flipping resource r for player i is cir. Each resource has to
be flipped individually; i.e., if a player chooses to flip multiple resources at the
same time, she still has to pay the flipping cost for each resource that she flips.
The goal of the attacker is to control the system of resources, while the goal
of the defender is to prevent the attacker from doing so. The criterion for the
attacker controlling the system can be defined in multiple ways, which makes the
generalization non-straightforward: as we will later see, different formulations can
lead to opposite results. In this paper, we study two elementary control models
(see Figure 2 for an illustration):
– All resources [AND]: The attacker controls the system only if she controls
all resources. Formally,
CA(t) = ZD1 (t) > Z
A
1 (t) ∧ . . . ∧ ZDN (t) > ZAN (t) . (6)
This models scenarios where the attacker has to compromise every resource
in order to compromise her target.
– One resource [OR]: The attacker controls the system if she controls at least
one resource. Formally,
CA(t) = ZD1 (t) > Z
A
1 (t) ∨ . . . ∨ ZDN (t) > ZAN (t) . (7)
This models scenarios where the attacker only has to compromise a single
resource in order to compromise her target.
Similarly to the basic FlipIt game, the players receive benefits proportional to
the time that they are controlling the system minus their costs of flipping the
resources. More complex control models can be built by combining the AND and
OR models in appropriate ways, but the study of that is left for future work.
Notice that, for non-adaptive strategies, the two control models are com-
pletely symmetric: the benefit of one player in one model is equivalent to the
benefit of the other player in the other model. Consequently, for non-adaptive
strategies, it suffices to compute the benefits only in one control model (the AND
model in our paper) as the formulas for the other model can be derived readily.
In the following sections, we introduce and study various FlipThem (i.e.,
multi-resource) strategies, compute the resulting asymptotic benefits, and dis-
cuss which strategies should be chosen by the players. First, in Section 4, we
study combinations of multiple single-resource strategies. Then, in Section 5, we
propose a novel multi-resource strategy class, called the Markov strategy class.
4 Combining Single-Resource Strategies
One of the challenges posed by FlipThem lies in the potentially complex struc-
ture of the strategies, which can use elaborate rules to exploit the dependence
tRes. #1:
tRes. #2:
AND:
OR:
Fig. 2. An illustration of the FlipThem game with the AND and OR control models
(see Figure 1 for graphical notations).
among the resources. A possible way of finding well-performing, yet analytically
tractable multi-resource strategies is to combine multiple single-resource strate-
gies that are known to perform well in the basic FlipIt game. In this section,
we propose and study two combinations:
– Independent: The player flips each resource independently of the other re-
sources. More specifically, the player uses N independent single-resource
strategies (i.e., processes), one for each resource, with each one having its
own flip rate αir. The asymptotic benefit of a player i using the independent
combination is βi = γi −∑Nr=1 cirαir.
– Synchronized: The player always flips all resources together. More specifi-
cally, the player uses only one single-resource strategy (i.e., process) for all
of the resources, with a single flip rate αi. The asymptotic benefit of a player
i using the synchronized combination is βi = γi − αi∑Nr=1 cir.
Since the AND and OR control models are symmetric, we only compute the
asymptotic gains in the AND model in this paper. Formulas for the asymptotic
gains in the OR model can be derived from our results readily. Furthermore,
since the defender’s asymptotic gain γD can be computed from the attacker’s
asymptotic gain γA using the simple formula γD = 1−γA, we only compute the
asymptotic gain of the attacker.
The proofs of the formulas can be found in the extended online version of
this paper [10]. Here, we first show the more general results for the strategy class
R ∪ P (Table 2); then, we analyze the game for the classes E and P (Table 3
and Figure 3).
Table 2 shows the attacker’s asymptotic gain for various multi-resource strate-
gies chosen by the defender and the attacker. The R ∪ P in the first and third
column indicates that we assume that the players use combinations of either
non-arithmetic renewal (R) or periodic (P) single-resource strategies. The com-
binations used by the defender and the attacker are in the second and fourth
Table 2. Asymptotic Gain for Various Combinations of Single-Resource Strategies
Defender Attacker Attacker’s gain
single-resource
strategies
comb. single-resource
strategies
comb. γA
R∪ P
ind.
R∪ P
ind.
∏N
r=1
∫∞
0
fZDr (zr)FZAr (zr)dzr
syn.
∫∞
0
∏N
r=1
(
1− FZDr (z)
)
fZA(z)dz
syn.
∫∞
0
fZD (z)FZA(z)dz
ind.
∫∞
0
∏N
r=1 FZAr (z)fZD (z)dz
columns, respectively. Finally, the attacker’s gain γA for the given combinations
is in the fifth column.
To express the attacker’s gain, we use a notion similar to that of the basic
FlipIt game. We let Zir be the random variable representing the time elapsed
since player i’s last flip on resource r (we omit the index r and denote it by
simply Zi if the player uses a synchronized strategy). We denote the cumulative
distribution and density functions of Zir by FZir (z) and fZir (z). These functions
can easily be computed from the generating distribution of any non-arithmetic
renewal strategy (see the extended online version [10]).
It is noteworthy that, when both players use the synchronized combination,
the game is equivalent to the basic FlipIt game (with ci =
∑
r c
i
r): each player
uses only one single-resource (i.e., basic FlipIt) strategy, and the state of all
resources is the same as they are always flipped together. Consequently, the
formula for the attacker’s gain is identical to the corresponding formula in [3].
Table 3 shows the attacker’s asymptotic gain for various combinations of
exponential and periodic strategies. We selected these single-resource strategies
because they are known to be optimal in some respect (see Section 2). The table
is similar to Table 2, except that the synchronized defender against independent
attacker case is omitted to keep the table simple (it can be found in the extended
version of this paper [10]) and because it is not a good strategy for either of the
players.
The table shows that the independent combination is generally better than
the synchronized one for the defender, as her flip rates are added together in the
former. This can be explained by the nature of the AND control model: since the
defender only needs to control at least one resource, her best strategy is to flip
one resource at a time. This forces the attacker to frequently flip all resources
back as she cannot know which resources were flipped by the defender (since the
exponential process is memoryless).
The formulas also suggest that the attacker should choose the synchro-
nized combination over the independent one. When both players use exponential
single-resource strategies, the attacker’s gain decays exponentially as the number
of resources increases (∼ k−N ) if she uses the independent combination, but only
Table 3. Asymptotic Gain for Various Combinations of Exponential and Periodic
Strategies
Defender Attacker Attacker’s gain
single-resource
strategy
comb. single-resource
strategy
comb. γA
E
ind.
E
ind.
∏N
r=1
αAr
αAr + α
D
r
syn.
αA
αA +
∑N
r=1 α
D
r
syn.
αA
αA + αD
ind.
P
ind.
∏N
r=1
αAr
αDr
(
1− e−
αDr
αAr
)
syn.
αA∑N
r=1 α
D
r
(
1− e−
∑N
r=1 α
D
r
αA
)
syn.
αA
αD
(
1− e−
αD
αA
)
according to a power law (∼ N−k) if she uses the synchronized one (given that
flip rates stay the same). When the attacker uses the periodic single-resource
strategy, the relationship between the number of resources and the attacker’s
gain is more complicated, but similar.
Figure 3 shows the attacker’s asymptotic gain as a function of the num-
ber of resources for various combinations of exponential and periodic strate-
gies. The plotted pairs of combinations are the following: both players use in-
dependent strategies (solid line ), the attacker uses synchronized while the
defender uses independent strategy (dashed line ), and both players use syn-
chronized strategies (dotted line ). The flip rates are assumed to be uniform,
i.e., αA = αAr = α
D = αDr = 1, r = 1, . . . , N .
The figure shows that, for the given single-resource classes and parameters,
the synchronized combination strongly dominates the independent one for the
attacker. Again, this can be explained by the nature of the AND control model:
since the attacker needs to control all resources, it makes sense to flip them
all together. Otherwise, the probability that all resources become controlled by
the attacker is very low. However, by using the synchronized combination, the
attacker loses the freedom of choosing the flipping rate for each resource inde-
pendently. Thus, when the heterogeneity of the attacker’s flipping costs is very
high, the independent combination may outperform the synchronized one.
The figure also supports our finding that the independent combination strongly
dominates the synchronized one for the defender. Since a player has complete
N
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(a) Both players use exponential
strategies.
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(b) Defender uses exponential, at-
tacker uses periodic strategy.
Fig. 3. The attacker’s asymptotic gain as a function of the number of resources for var-
ious combinations of exponential and periodic strategies. Plotted pairs of combination
are: both players use independent strategies (solid line), attacker uses synchronized
strategies while defender uses independent strategies (dashed line), and both players
use synchronized strategies (dotted line). In this figure, the flip rates are assumed to
be uniform, i.e., αA = αAr = α
D = αDr = 1, r = 1, . . . , N .
freedom in choosing her flip rates in the independent combination, this combi-
nation is better for the defender even for very heterogeneous flipping costs.
Finally, by comparing Subfigures 3a and 3b, we conclude that the periodic
strategy dominates the exponential strategy as the attacker’s gain is higher when
she chooses the former.
5 The Markov Strategy Class
In the previous section, we studied how single-resource strategies can be com-
bined into multi-resource strategies. However, such combinations represent only
a tiny fraction of the actual multi-resource strategy space as there are an in-
finite number of multi-resource strategies that cannot be represented by such
simple combinations. For example, a defender might choose to flip one resource
periodically, then wait for a time interval chosen according to an exponential dis-
tribution, and then flip another resource. To model such complex multi-resource
strategies, in this section, we introduce the Markov strategy class.
For the clarity of presentation, we derive results for two resources, yet the
approach is applicable for any number of resources. Furthermore, as opposed to
the basic model, we are going to use discrete time in this section. Note that the
discrete time model can be very realistic as players typically do not flip their re-
sources at arbitrary times. Examples are the change of passwords, cryptographic
keys or the application of software updates. We denote the duration of a time
step by ∆. Finally, we define the time-dependent age functions as follows. The
random variables representing the number of time steps elapsed since the last
flip of resource r by the attacker and the defender at time k are denoted by
ZAr (k) and Z
D
r (k), respectively.
In the case of two resources, the attacker can perform one of the following
actions in a given time slot:
– she does not flip any of the resources,
– she flips one of the resources,
– or she flips both resources.
If the decision which action to choose depends only on the times elapsed since
the previous flips of the resources, then {(ZA1 (k), ZA2 (k)), k = 0, 1, . . . } defines
a Markov process. In this case, the behavior of the attacker can be characterized
by the following joint distributions corresponding to the events that can happen
in two consecutive time steps:
p
(0)
i,j = Pr
[
ZA1 (k) = i, Z
A
2 (k) = j, Z
A
1 (k + 1) = i+ 1, Z
A
2 (k + 1) = j + 1
]
p
(1)
i,j = Pr
[
ZA1 (k) = i, Z
A
2 (k) = j, Z
A
1 (k + 1) = 0, Z
A
2 (k + 1) = j + 1
]
p
(2)
i,j = Pr
[
ZA1 (k) = i, Z
A
2 (k) = j, Z
A
1 (k + 1) = i+ 1, Z
A
2 (k + 1) = 0
]
p
(1,2)
i,j = Pr
[
ZA1 (k) = i, Z
A
2 (k) = j, Z
A
1 (k + 1) = 0, Z
A
2 (k + 1) = 0
]
,
where p
(0)
i,j is the probability that nothing is flipped in the next time step, p
(1)
i,j
(p
(2)
i,j ) is the probability that only resource 1 (or 2) is flipped, while p
(1,2)
i,j is the
probability of both resources being flipped in the next time step.
We denote by Mp the Markov strategy generated by a Markov process with
event probabilities p = {p(0)i,j , p(1)i,j , p(2)i,j , p(1,2)i,j for i, j = 0, 1, . . . }, and by M the
class of all Markov strategies. That is,
M = {Mp | p is a set of event probabilities} . (8)
5.1 Linear Programming Solution
With these definitions and notations, we can define a linear program to determine
the optimal probabilities p
(•)
i,j . However, since linear programming problems can
only be solved with a finite number of variables (in the general case), we have
to restrict the game to a finite time horizon. The last time step we take into
consideration is denoted by T .
The attacker wants to maximize her benefit βA, which is composed of the
asymptotic gain and the cost of the flips against both resources as
βA = max
p
{ T∑
i=0
T∑
j=0
qi,jPr
[
ZD1 > i, Z
D
2 > j
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
γA
(9)
− cA1
( T∑
i=0
T∑
j=0
p
(1)
i,j + p
(1,2)
i,j
) 1
∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
αA1
−cA2
( T∑
i=0
T∑
j=0
p
(2)
i,j + p
(1,2)
i,j
) 1
∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
αA2
}
,
where qi,j is the probability that the number of time steps since the attacker’s
last flips of resource 1 and 2 are i and j, respectively. This probability can be
expressed easily as qi,j = p
(0)
i,j + p
(1)
i,j + p
(2)
i,j + p
(1,2)
i,j ; thus, the objective function
given by (9) defines a linear relation with respect to p
(•)
i,j .
As variables p
(•)
i,j must be valid probabilities, we need to apply the inequality
constraints p
(0)
i,j ≥ 0, p(1)i,j ≥ 0, p(2)i,j ≥ 0, p(12)i,j ≥ 0; and we also need to ensure that
the probabilities sum up to 1, that is,
∑T
i=0
∑T
j=0 p
(0)
i,j + p
(1)
i,j + p
(2)
i,j + p
(1,2)
i,j = 1.
Further equality constraints are required to define the possible state transi-
tions, yielding
qi,j = p
(0)
i−1,j−1 for i > 0, j > 0, q0,0 =
T∑
i=0
T∑
j=0
p
(1,2)
i,j ,
q0,j =
T∑
i=0
p
(1)
i,j−1 for j > 0, qi,0 =
T∑
j=0
p
(2)
i−1,j for i > 0, (10)
with qi,j given above.
Finally, we require that a resource is always flipped in the next time step if
its age has reached the maximum age T :
p
(0)
i,j = 0 for i = T or j = T, p
(1)
i,j = 0 for j = T, p
(2)
i,j = 0 for i = T. (11)
5.2 Results
The linear program defined above answers several questions regarding the Flip-
Them game, including the following:
– What is the attacker’s optimal strategy against a given defender strategy?
– What are the optimal flip rates maximizing the defender’s benefit if the
attacker always plays an optimal strategy?
– What is the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Solving the optimization problem using a linear programming based approach
poses some challenges. In particular, the length of the time horizon T is limited
by the capabilities of the linear program solver. For our examples, we used the
built-in solver of MATLAB with T = 30 (resulting in 900 variables in case of
two resources).4 Note that the number of variables increases polynomially in
the length of the time horizon and exponentially in the number of resources.
Using custom software, the analysis can be extended to much larger values of
T ; however, the results we obtained with MATLAB are already revealing and
useful.
In the rest of this section, we consider several numerical examples to demon-
strate the usefulness of the model. In each of these examples, the attacker is as-
sumed to be non-adaptive (NA), but she is assumed to know the strategy of the
4 This can model, for example, the key update policy of a company over a duration
of 2.5 years assuming that updates are defined by the granularity of a month.
defender (KS). The defender, however, has no information about the attacker.
For the definitions and rationale behind these modeling choices, see Section 2.
Optimal attack against a given defender strategy In this example, the
defender flips the resources according to independent Poisson processes with pa-
rameters αD1 = 1 and α
D
2 = 3. The joint age function is then Pr
[
ZD1 > i, Z
D
2 > j
]
=
e−α
D
1 i∆−αD2 j∆. The attacker’s flip costs are cA1 = 0.1 and c
A
2 = 0.05. The discrete
problem is solved with T = 30 and ∆ = 0.03.
At this point, we take the opportunity to introduce the conditional state
transition probability matrices P (0),P (1),P (2) and P (1,2) that help to visualize
and understand the strategy of the attacker. The entries of these matrices are
[P (•)]i,j =
p
(•)
i,j
p
(0)
i,j + p
(1)
i,j + p
(2)
i,j + p
(1,2)
i,j
. (12)
To simulate an attack, one has to follow the state of the attacker given
by positions i, j in the matrices. In state (i, j), no flips occur with probability
[P (0)]i,j , and the next state of the attacker is (i + 1, j + 1). With probability
[P (1)]i,j (or [P
(2)]i,j), only resource 1 (or resource 2) is flipped in the next time
step, and the next state of the system is (0, j + 1) (or (i + 1, 0)). Finally, both
resources are flipped in the next time step with probability [P (1,2)]i,j , followed
by a jump to state (0, 0).
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Fig. 4. Optimal attack strategy against two resources flipped according to independent
Poisson processes.
By solving the linear program, we obtain the optimal strategy of the attacker,
represented by the matrices depicted in Figure 4. In this particular example,
the entries of all four matrices are all either 0 (represented by white squares)
or 1 (black squares). Matrix P (1) is not depicted as it has only 0 entries. By
following the attacker’s strategy in the above described manner, we have that
she first waits 9 time steps (black squares on the diagonal of [P (0)]), then flips
one resource (black square in P (2)(9, 9)), waits another 10 time steps, and finally
flips both resources (black square in P (1,2)(20, 11)).
Thus, based on the matrices, a “periodic” attack can be identified with a
period of δ = 20. The resources are not flipped in a synchronized manner. Re-
source 2 is flipped at the 9th time step from the beginning of the period, while
both resources are flipped at the end of the period.
If the defender flips both resources according to independent periodic strate-
gies, the joint age process is given by Pr
[
ZD1 > i, Z
D
2 > j
]
= (1 − αD1 i∆)(1 −
αD2 j∆), if i∆ < 1/α
D
1 , j∆ < 1/α
D
2 , and Pr
[
ZD1 > i, Z
D
2 > j
]
= 0 otherwise.
When keeping all parameters the same as before, the optimal strategy of the
attacker is more complex in this case (see Figure 5). The period of her strategy
is δ = 22 now, and she flips solely resource 2 at time steps 6 and 13, while she
flips both resources at time step 22, which also marks the end of her period.
It is noteworthy that the attacker’s benefit is 0.265 in the Poisson case, but
only 0.047 in the periodic case, which means that the periodic defense is less
economical to attack (given, of course, that the attacker has no knowledge on
the last move of the defender, thus it is of type NA).
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Fig. 5. Optimal attack strategy against two resources flipped according to independent
periodic strategies.
Defender’s optimal flip rates The linear program can also be used to find
the defender’s optimal flip rates given that the attacker always uses her best-
response strategy. Notice that we do not calculate a Nash equilibrium here, thus
the defender does not have to take the strategy of the attacker into consideration.
First, consider the case when the defender flips her resources according to
independent Poisson processes. Assume that the attacker’s flipping costs are
cA1 = 0.1 and c
A
2 = 0.2. We solved the linear program with various combinations
of αD1 and α
D
2 , and with two different settings for the parameters c
D
1 and c
D
2 .
The results are shown in Figure 6. As the benefit of the attacker is the subject of
optimization in the linear program, the corresponding plot is obviously smooth,
and gives higher values for lower flip rates of the defender. The corresponding
gain rates (which are not plotted due to the lack of space), however, are not
smooth. As the defender’s benefit is directly related to the attacker’s gain rate,
the plots of the defender’s benefit are not smooth either. The maximum benefit
for the defender is 0.222, obtained at αD1 = 0.8, α
D
2 = 0.7.
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Fig. 6. Benefits of the attacker (βA) and defender (βD) for various flip rates of the
defender (Poisson case). Darker shades of gray indicate higher benefit.
If the defender flips the resources according to independent periodic strate-
gies, higher flip rates are required to maximize her benefit. The corresponding
results are depicted in Figure 7: the optimal flip rates are αD1 = 0.9, α
D
2 = 1.2,
and her benefit βD = 0.61595 is higher compared to the Poisson case. Observe
that the attacker always drops out for higher flip rates, which is indicated by
the white area on the plot of her benefit and also by the sharp line appearing
on the plots of the defender’s benefit.
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Fig. 7. Benefits of the attacker (βA) and defender (βD) for various flip rates of the
defender (periodic case). Darker shades of indicate higher benefit.
Optimal flip for a fixed budget In this example, we assume that the defender
has a fixed budget, and we are looking for the flip rates maximizing her benefit.
By a fixed budget, we mean that the defender spends a fixed amount B on
average on flipping her resources, thus B = cD1 α
D
1 + c
D
2 α
D
2 is fixed, while the
ratio of the flip rates R = αD1 /α
D
2 is subject of optimization. Notice that B and
R determine the flip rates uniquely as
αD1 =
RB
cD1 R+ c
D
2
, αD2 =
B
cD1 R+ c
D
2
. (13)
The flip costs of the attacker and the defender are set to cA1 = 0.1, c
A
2 =
0.05 and cD1 = c
D
2 = 0.001, the total cost is B = 0.004, and we apply a finer
discretization in this example with T = 90 and ∆ = 0.01.
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Fig. 8. Benefits of the attacker and the defender as functions of the ratio between the
flip rates for the resources.
Figure 8 depicts the players’ benefits assuming that the attacker always flips
according to her best-response Markov strategy. The optimal ratio R (from the
defenders point of view) is 3.4 when she flips her resources periodically, and it
is between 0.9 and 5.2 when she uses exponential strategies. By looking at the
results closer, we find that, when the defender chooses an optimal ratio, the
attacker uses a synchronized periodic attack against the resources in both cases.
Nash equilibrium The proposed linear program can be applied to calculate
the optimal strategies of both the defender and the attacker. We can thus use a
simple iterative algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium of the game. This algorithm
starts with assigning a random strategy to the defender, followed by the alter-
nating optimizations of the attacker’s and the defender’s strategies. In practice,
however, we found that this algorithm does not converge in the vast majority of
the cases, but it starts oscillating after a number of iterations, suggesting that
no Nash equilibrium exists.
6 Concluding Remarks
Extending the FlipIt game to multiple resources requires modeling the players’
goals as functions of the compromised resources. We selected the two most in-
tuitive choices, namely the AND and OR control models, to represent the gains
derived from controlling the resources. From the attacker’s viewpoint, the AND
control model represents the case when all resources need to be compromised
to get access to the system. This is similar to the total effort model of security
interdependence in the state-of-the-art [9,20]. The OR control model represents
the case when the compromise of a single resource suffices to get access. This
second choice relates to the weakest link model of interdependence [9,20].
We proposed two major classes of multi-resource strategies: combinations
of single-resource strategies (independent processes and synchronized processes)
and the Markov strategy class. Based on our result, we can formulate a set of
recommendations for the defender. These recommendations can be readily used
in practice where the assumptions of the FlipThem game apply, for example,
when defining the key update strategy for a security infrastructure.
– In the AND control model, we found that the defender should use inde-
pendent flipping strategies. In practice, this means that cryptographic keys
should not be updated at the same time, but rather independently.
– On the other hand, in the OR control model, the defender should use syn-
chronized flipping strategies. In practice, this means updating cryptographic
keys synchronously. However, the defender needs to pay attention to the
cost of updating keys in the OR control model. If these costs are very het-
erogeneous, the key update processes should remain synchronized, but with
different update rates across the keys.
– If the attacker is non-adaptive, then the periodic defender strategy is a good
choice according to our numerical results.5 Periodic strategies have multiple
advantageous properties such as higher benefits for the defender, robustness
to optimization errors and ease of implementation in practice. However, peri-
odic strategies perform poorly against an LM attacker [3]. Thus, the defender
needs to carefully assess the potential information available to an attacker
when choosing her strategy.
– Surprisingly, the defender’s benefit is not a smooth or monotonic function of
her flip rates, which makes optimization difficult in practice. Our numerical
results imply that this observation holds for any combination of the periodic
and the exponential strategy classes. The major reason behind this non-
monotonous property is that, as the defender’s flip rate reaches a threshold,
the attacker drops out of the game. In realistic cases, the defender’s flipping
cost is much lower than the attacker’s flipping cost, which causes the attacker
to drop out.
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